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REACTION TO TERRORISM: 
A JEWISH LAW CAVEAT 
J. David Bleich• 
I suppose that it is axiomatic that not everything that is legal is 
moral, and conversely, not everything that is moral is legal. Professor 
Halberstam asked me to discuss the concept of war, both within a gen-
eral philosophical framework and within the framework of Jewish law. 
In a certain sense I feel that my comments are entirely irrelevant; I am 
unaware that any government has ever consulted a moralist before em-
barking upon a course of military activity. Yet, at the same time, my 
comments may not be entirely irrelevant because international law, 
although certainly not determined by moral systems, is at least informed 
by them. Natural law doctrines, in particular, have exercised a profound 
influence over the development of international law concepts such as ne-
cessity and proportionality. These concepts are clearly rooted in philo-
sophical traditions. 
I am going to assume certain facts with regard to the various exam-
ples that Professor Halberstam has set out. Facts must be assumed be-
cause moral judgment in any specific case will hinge upon determination 
of the particular facts of the case. If my analysis of the facts is correct-
and it may not be, since I have no claim to knowledge of all the relevant 
facts-it would seem to me that, on the basis of the facts as I perceive 
them, the various military incursions in response to terrorism could very 
well be def ended on the basis of natural law theories, but could not be 
defended on the basis of Jewish law and morality. 
The notion of a just war is a natural law concept. Let me try to 
summarize the concept very briefly, and then plug it into the relevant 
fact patterns. The concept of a just war flows from the notion of natural 
rights. Natural rights, or at least perfect rights, involve rights which 
command deference from other individuals. If an individual has a cer-
tain right which he can exercise vis-a-vis others, and which others must 
adhere and defer to, then the natural law argument is that those rights 
become vacuous and totally nugatory unless they are enforceable. The 
only manner in which those rights can be enforced, in the ultimate sense, 
is by physical might. Hence, as a corollary to the notion of a natural 
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right, there is the idea of a subsidiary right of coercion. The notion in 
natural law theory is that not only do individuals possess such rights, but 
that states possess those rights as well. 
The state may enforce those rights against both individuals and 
other states. A just war, then, according to natural law theory, may be 
undertaken for a variety of different reasons. The first is to protect or 
, recover the subject matter of that right, i.e., self-defense, defense of prop-
erty or protection of any other natural right. Secondly, a just war may be 
undertaken to execute the equivalent of that right when the right itself is 
not enforceable. That is simply a code phrase for reparations; according 
to natural law theory, a war undertaken for the purpose of securing repa-
rations is an entirely legitimate enterprise. The third purpose for which a 
just war may be undertaken is for the purpose of imposing punishment 
upon individuals or states that have violated these natural rights; war is 
justified as a form of retributive justice which is predicated upon the no-
tion of restoring a proper balance as a means of maintaining law and 
justice. Punishment for the violation of norms of justice serves as a suffi-
cient validating motive for a just war. Finally, a just war may be under-
taken for the purpose of assuring future security; if a war is necessary as 
a deterrent in order to prevent others from committing similar wrongs in 
the distant future, the war is regarded as a just war. 
There are, however, limitations upon the exercise of the right of en-
gaging in just warfare. The first and most significant limitation is neces-
sity: war is permitted only as a last resort. If there are other methods 
that can be employed to achieve any of the legitimate goals of war, those 
methods must be utilized first; only as a last resort may a state engage in 
war. The second limitation is proportionality, i.e., the damage inflicted 
must be proportionate to the subject matter of the right it is designed to 
secure. I confess to an inability to define proportionality in any rigorous 
way. But it is clear that a concept of proportionality does exist within 
natural law theory. Finally, the right of just war is restricted to public 
authority. 
The right to wage war is restricted to public authority for a variety 
of reasons. First, the state is entrusted with the waging of war in its role 
as the natural guardian of justice, peace and order; others, not charged 
with that responsibility, are denied the exercise of this right. Secondly, 
and probably more significantly, there is no higher court of appeal; there 
is no one other than the state to whom an aggrieved individual or soci-
ety-a collective aggregate of individuals-can appeal. This, of course, is 
linked to the concept of necessity. Other individuals and groups have an 
appeal, at least in theory, to the state to def end their rights and protect 
their interests. Therefore, they have no right to engage in armed warfare. 
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However, since the state cannot appeal to any other body, it has the right 
to engage in warfare. Finally, a negative reason: No individual has the 
right to imperil the good of the members of the society. It is only the 
state, which acts as the spokesman, the executive arm, of all members of 
society, that has the right to engage in activities which may ultimately 
result in danger to the members of that society. 
I think that if one examines any of the recent responses to terrorist 
activity in light of these considerations, it would not be difficult to justify, 
in terms of natural law, the use of force and arms in order to eliminate 
potential threats. This assumes, of course, that proportionality has been 
preserved and that necessity is also present in the sense that there is no 
other way to restore the legitimate natural rights which are inherent in 
members of all societies. 
There is one question which I have not addressed and which I will 
not address in any great detail, namely, the extent to which these natural 
rights may be limited by covenant, and hence, the degree to which the 
right to engage in an otherwise just war is limited by covenant, particu-
larly by the United Nations Charter, which is binding upon the member 
states of the United Nations. Resolution of that involves a matter of 
exegesis, an enterprise designed to determine what is banned by the 
Charter and what is not banned by the Charter. Moreover, it involves 
the more fundamental question of whether certain rights can be waived 
by covenant. It seems to me that this is a question which requires a great 
deal more analysis than it has received, certainly more than it has re-
ceived in recent years. 
Taking this general framework, and comparing it with Jewish teach-
ing with regard to precisely the same issues, there are a number of points 
that must be made which are essentially negative in nature. Some of 
them, in fact, have been made by natural law theorists. The first is that, 
in terms of Jewish teaching, no evidence can be adduced from Scripture 
with regard to the legitimacy of warfare, or with regard to the concept of 
a just war. This was something that was of particular interest and con-
cern to exponents of the concept of a just war within the framework of 
natural law theory. There are countless biblical narratives concerning 
warfare in which the war in question seems to be regarded as entirely 
legitimate. Natural law theorists dispose of those narratives very simply 
by indicating that in each and every instance the war described was un-
dertaken at divine behest. Wars undertaken upon divine command must 
be examined in an entirely different perspective. Generally, those wars 
also involve some form of retributive justice; as such, they could readily 
be justified under natural law, particularly because it was the Deity who 
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ordained the punishment. In point of fact, this is entirely compatible 
with Jewish teaching with regard to the particular wars in question. 
Exodus 15:3, which is usually translated as "the Lord is a man of 
war," is understood in the rabbinic tradition in an entirely different way: 
"The Lord is the master of war." Since God alone is the master of war, 
there is no authority to engage in warfare other than upon specific divine 
command. That explains very simply the requirement for the Urim and 
Thummin, the consultation of the breastplate of the High Priest, before 
embarking on war. The consultation of the breastplate of the High Priest 
was, in effect, an appeal for divine guidance; hence, all warfare was un-
dertaken under color of divine license and dispensation. With limited 
exceptions, other forms of warfare were regarded as illicit and unlawful. 
Jewish morality embodies, at most, a very limited concept of natural 
law, and certainly no concept of a just war as being sanctioned by natural 
law. That does not mean, however, that any military response, under 
any and all circumstances, is unlawful and illegitimate. On the contrary, 
wars of defense are legitimate, but are legitimate not as a new juridical 
concept of warfare, but under the general rubric of self-defense. How-
ever, the law of defense in Jewish morality is much broader than it is 
under most systems of law. In Jewish law it is not termed self-defense; 
rather, it is termed the law of pursuit or the law of the pursuer. It extends 
not only to the individual who is the actual or potential victim of aggres-
sion, but also legitimizes intervention on behalf of any innocent individ-
ual. Protection of any innocent party is legitimate under the general 
category of the law of pursuit. There are, however, a number of signifi-
cant limitations: Proportionality is not one of them. An individual has a 
right to protect himself and his property. Anticipation that a person will 
defend hearth and home and any other property right gives rise to the 
assumption that the aggressor will employ physical force in achieving his 
goal and thus threaten the life of his potential victim. Not only the po-
tential victim, but any third party may intervene, if necessary, in order to 
preserve the life of the innocent victim. The element of necessity is, how-
ever, very much present. The taking of a human life cannot be sanc-
tioned unless there is no other way to eliminate the threat of aggression. 
There is another limitation which turns out to be extremely signifi-
cant and also serves as a crucial limiting factor, particularly when deal-
ing with acts of terrorism: The law of pursuit permits the elimination of 
the aggressor, and of the aggressor only. The notion of proportionality 
enters under an entirely different guise when a third party is concerned. 
The law of pursuit cannot be invoked against an individual who is not an 
aggressor and who is not in a position of aiding and abetting the act of 
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aggression; that individual's life remains inviolate. Hence, if one is re-
sponding to an act of aggression, it is unlawful and immoral to take the 
life of an innocent noncombatant, even if the taking of that life is 
unintended. 
Judaism, unlike other theological systems, does not posit a double-
effect theory, certainly not in cases where the harm to the innocent party 
is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the contemplated act. 
The net result is that to justify response to acts of terrorism under this 
broadened concept of self-defense, it is necessary to limit the response to 
only those individuals who pose a threat. The threat must be one which 
is imminent; it must be certain, or must be present with near certainty. If 
the threat is not certain, or if a response will require the elimination of an 
individual who is not a combatant and who is not a participant in the act 
of aggression, it cannot be justified under the law of pursuit. 
Yet, it is clear that Judaism does recognize the legitimacy of a war 
of self-defense even under circumstances where the war could not be re-
garded as legitimate under the general rubric of the law of pursuit. The 
problem is the source of that dispensation; how to categorize the legiti-
macy of this response; and what are its parameters and limitations. A 
general justification is found in exegesis associated with Genesis 9:5. Gen-
esis 9:5 reads as follows: "But your blood of your lives will I require; . . . 
from the hand of man from the hand of a person's brother will I require 
the life of man." The phrase which presented difficulty to the classical 
rabbinic commentators was the seemingly redundant phrase, "from the 
hand of a person's brother." There is a history of exegesis which under-
stands that phrase as a limitation upon the prohibition against homicide. 
The limitation seems to present a philosophical and legal framework for 
justifying wars of self-defense, at least under some conditions. The gen-
eral understanding of that phrase is that the prohibition against homicide 
is binding in situations in which brotherly love either exists or should 
exist. But when prevailing circumstances reflect the antithesis of a state 
of brotherhood, and man is living in a state in which brotherly love and 
affection are nonexistent, the prohibition against homicide does not 
apply. 
When do those circumstances pertain? From the formulation of the 
definition of a war of self-defense in Jewish law, it is clear that the obliga-
tion of brotherly love is suspended only in the face of direct aggression. 
To put it in somewhat different terms, only when a state of belligerency 
actually exists may one embark upon a course of self-defense in the form 
of warfare involving, as it does, civilian casualities, rather than merely 
elimination of the agressor himself-what otherwise would be called a 
just war. It may very well tum out to be the case, as Professor Reisman 
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has stressed, that such conditions do not exist when there is a limited 
armed attack, an incident which is isolated in nature, but exist only when 
there are repeated armed incursions, i.e., a level of belligerency which 
rises beyond mere isolated acts to a state of actual warfare. Essentially, 
warfare is sanctioned only in situations in which one can no longer antic-
ipate that common rules of morality will pertain-when there is a total 
and complete breakdown of international law and order. Absent a break-
down of the general fabric of international law and order, an armed re-
sponse to isolated acts of aggression could not be sanctioned under the 
rubric of a war of self-defense. 
If one examines the many recent responses to acts of terrorism, the 
crucial fact, from this vantage point, is that in virtually all cases casual-
ties were inflicted upon noncombatants-individuals who were totally in-
nocent of any aggressive intent. That cannot be sanctioned unless one is 
prepared to defend the action as rising to the level of a war of self-de-
fense; in order to do so, a state of belligerency must exist. I submit that 
in most, if not all, of the cases that were presented earlier this evening, 
those conditions simply did not pertain. The net result is that on my 
analysis of the fact patterns, in some, and perhaps all, of the specific ex-
amples that were given, although the response in question might have 
been justified in terms of the notion of a just war under natural law doc-
trines, it seems to me that those responses cannot be justified on the basis 
of application of the principles of Jewish law. 
